Capitalists, peasants and land in Africa: A comparative perspective by Williams, Gavin
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
A F R I C A N S T U D I E S I N S T I T U T E
African Studies Seminar Paper
to be presented in RW
4.00pm AUGUST 1991




Capitalists, Peasants and Land in Africa: A Comparative
Perspective
Gavin Williams
Paper presented to the South Africa Economic
Research and Training Project Policy Workshop
'Towards a new agrarian democratic order1
Landbouw Universiteit Wageningen, Nederland, 1989.This paper
has arises from work towards a comparative and historical
study of the development of the agrarian social structures
of South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania which will be
published, one day, by Routledge as Land and Freedom. A
Personal Research Grant 0024 2043 from the Economic and
Social Research Council enabled me to do much of the work
for this study, and this paper extends my report to the ESRC
on that research project.
My arguments respond to communications and discussions with
a number of friends and colleagues, who have shared their
own work and knowledge with me, most particularly Gunilla
Andrae,. Bjorn Beckman, Debby Bryceson, Paul Clough, Philip
Corrigan, Mike Cowen, David Cooper, Judith Heyer, Marian
Lacey, John Lonsdale, Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Richard Palmer-
Jones, Philip Raikes, Pepe Roberts, Michael Rosen, Bob
Shenton, Stanley Trapido, Tina Wallace, Annie Whitehead and
Liz Wiley. I have drawn shamelessly on their work, but they
are in no way responsible for any of my conclusions, with
which they will find much to disagree.
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Gavin Williams,
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The paper compares the development of various forms of
capitalist and peasant agriculture and state policies
towards them in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania
during the coloniao and post-colonial periods. At first
sight, our four African examples appear to exemplify
distinct patterns of historical transformation: one
capitalist (South Africa) and two peasant, one (Nigeria) in
a 'capitalist' and one (Tanzania) in a 'socialist1 context,
and an anmalous fourth version, combining capitalist and
peasant forms. However, wage labour and family labour are
found in agricultural production in all'the countries
studied, and labour-, share- and rent tenancies are
important in several. These different forms of labour are
combined in single enterprises, both on capitalist and
peasant farms, and in the strategies adopted by individuals
and households to provide for their needs. Similarly,
governments of very different political persuasions have
often adopted similar policies to control, regulate and
'develop' rural people. Our four examples do not display
clearly divergent directions, but they are also not
obviously converging on some common destination. In
particular, they are not all undergoing the passage from
peasant to capitalist, or even to socialist, agriculture. In
some cases, the direction of change may be quite the
reverse.
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According to Marx, the original accumulation of capital required the
separation of the producers from their means of production. However, the
dispossession of the producers, and the displacement of non-capitalist
relations of production, has proved to be neither final, nor complete.
Nowhere is this more evident than in agriculture. Landowners have found
it impossible to recruit, direct, and maintain a labour force through
wage payments alone. They have used their access to governments, national
and local, to guarantee their markets, and to restrict farm workers
mobility and access to independent incomes. To gain control of the labour
of others, or of the products of that labour, they have had to engage in
a variety of rent-, share-, or labour-tenancy contracts and have often
recruited migrant wage workers from members of landholding rural
households rather than from a resident, landless proletariat.
The expansion of agricultural production has not always followed from
the concentration of holdings into large-scale enterprises. Smallholders
have often proved capable of making better use of land and of other
resources, of better adapting production to changes in demand, and of
delivering crops to the market more cheaply, than have large landowners.
Smallholder production can support a larger population than capitalist
farming and provide a more extensive market for a variety of locally-
supplied goods and services, enhancing rural people's access to non-farm
incomes. The most distinctive advantage of large landowners has been
their ability to secure privileged access to credit from banks and to
markets, and to protection and subsidies from governments.
Rural households usually combine farming with other ways of earning
incomes. Peasant farming and wage labour complement one another, both as
sources 3f incomes for peasant-workers, and by allowing capitalists to
pay workers wages only for that period when their labour is required. But
peasant farming and wage labour also compete with one another, and with
domestic tasks, for the labour time of the different members of rural
households, as well as for grazing and arable land and access to markets.
Land is necessary, but not sufficient, for agricultural production.
Farmers need money to pay for tools and livestock, and for machines and
chemicals, as well as to buy many items of consumption. They need access
to transport and markets if they are to sell their produce. People seek
access to land to cultivate crops and to graze their animals. Some may
acquire land in order to secure control over the labour of others; some
want access to land as one way of securing a measure of independence from
control by others.
Access to labour is central to any system of agricultural production.
People may recruit labour through a variety of relations - family ties
and marital obligations to spouses and their kin, reciprocal exchanges,
slavery, tribute and compulsion, tenancy of land, and cash payments for a
day's work or a job to be done. These are often combined with one another
within a farm enterprise, and also as part of a single contract. Rights
and obligations, access to and the divisions of labour are differentiated
by gender and by generation and take a variety of forms. Household
relations changed in response to the expansion of commercial production,
and of labour migration, male and female, permanent and temporary.
Smallholders and labour-tenants depended for their farming activities on
the labour of their households. Settler farmers, and their wives, laid
claim to the labour of the wives and children of their male tenants,
whose own access to land thus depended on their ensuring that their
family were available to work for the farm owners.
The colonial state and its successors have claimed and enforced their
authority to define the nature of rights to land, and to decide which
people may gain access to which land, what crops they may grow on it, and
how they may cultivate it. States authorize, regulate, enforce and
tolerate the rights of husbands, fathers, employers, chiefs and the state
itself over the labour of others. They regulate and tax external, and
often internal, trade and may claim monopolies over external or internal
markets. Political authorities protect the access of some to certain
market opportunities, excluding others, by criteria of race, community
membership or national citizenship. The contemporary state asserts its
right to define its own aims as the goals of public policy and to
identify its own interests as the public interest.
Access to land, to labour, and to markets are bound up with one
another and depend on the actions of political authorities. Different,
and often conflicting interests, outwith and within the state itself/
seek to use government institutions for their own benefits. Government's
directives may be evaded or resisted or turned to other purposes than
intended.
Support for nationalism in Africa and the forms it has taken have been
shaped by different colonial policies and economic relations, and by
people's various class situations and experiences of state authorities.
The divergent aspirations and grievances of different groups were
generalized by political leaders into demands for national independence,
which promised to give people access to resources and opportunities from
which they had been excluded.
Rural smallholders look to the state to provide opportunities to
better their condition. They want their rights to arable and grazing land
protected; roads and markets for their crops and livestock; access to the
inputs they wish to use to grow the crops they choose to cultivate. They
want to be able to sell their crops freely in the best possible markets
and to buy commodities in the cheapest markets. They often want schools
for their children and opportunities for them in the urban economy. They
do not want to be made to provide labour, or to be told what to grow or
how to grow it. In short, they want, though they rarely expect, the state
to provide the conditions under which they can progress by their own
activities; they do not want the state to develop them.
Those who inherited the political kingdom have generally pursued the
project of the 'development' of the country which they inherited from the
colonial state. Governments have usually provided resources to rural
communities in ways which are designed to extend their control over
peasants. They have extended colonial marketing arrangements to tax
peasants and to regulate agricultural production. Peasants have evaded
and resisted attempts to tax them and to direct their lives in the name
of development. Where returns have proven inadequate, they have diverted
their activities to other crops, or bought and sold commodities on black
markets, or failed to follow the directives of irrigation projects or
outgrower schemes. State policies have often impoverished peasants and
discouraged agricultural production. In a few cases they have secured the
cooperation of peasants and the expansion of production of lucrative
crops. 'Development' is an activity of state; it is done to people and,
possibly, for them, but not by them. It both requires and justifies the
extension of state control over rural producers.
Comparative Perspectives
The four countries considered here. South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and
Tanzania, exemplify important differences in their patterns of historical
development. They also share certain similarities and common, if not
always contemporaneous, experiences. At the outset of colonial rule land
was relatively abundant and accessible in all these countries. The
problem was to find labour to work it- Similar styles of colonial
administration extended to all four countries - to the 'native reserves'
in countries where white settlers had appropriated much of the land -
involving such colonial constructs as residential segregation, indirect
rule and Native Administration, customary law, communal land tenure,
agricultural betterment, and control of agricultural marketing. Since
independence, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania have pursued 'development' in
different ways, and have been the recipients of development aid and the
sites of development projects, a model now emulated by the Development
Bank of South Africa.
South Africa
In South Africa, capitalism has come to predominate in agricultural
production, as in mining and manufacturing. White settlers appropriated
most of the country's land. They used the military, legal, administrative
and fiscal powers of the state to define and enforce their claim to
ownership of land and to establish, subsidize, and sustain variants of
capitalist agriculture.
Capitalist agriculture in South Africa had its origins in many forms
of recruitment and control of labour. Labour has been provided by
slaves, indentured labour, apprenticed captives and tribute labour; rent-
and share- tenants, resident labour tenants and by migrant contract
workers and has been obtained from forced labour and prison labour, by
the employment, with and without wages, of women and children, as well as
through the recruitment of resident male wage workers. Restrictions on
access to land and obligations on all adult males to pay taxes were used
to get Africans to work for wages. Workers' freedom has always been
constrained by pass and by vagrancy laws to restrict their mobility. In
recent decades there have, in many farming districts, been sharp
reductions in the seasonal labour force and wages have risen for many
permanent workers. Huge numbers of labour tenants and workers from farras
and from rural towns were relocated to resettlement and squatter camps in
the Bantustans , where they have often had no access either to arable or
grazing land or to jobs. The restructuring of capitalist agriculture has
sustained farmers access to and control, over cheap labour, and made farm
workers less secure than ever in their access to employment and a place t
live.6
Production has been expanded to meet South African, African and
overseas markets. White farmers were served by railway branch lines and
low railway tariffs on crops, and by the Land Bank. Agricultural
marketing is dominated by state, cooperative, and corporate interests.
The prosperity of capitalist farming, especially maize and beef
production, continues to be dependent on state pricing policies and is
vulnerable to an ever-rising weight of debts. Corporate interests own
extensive areas of land today, as they did at the beginning of the
century. Capitalist agricultural production has been fed by increasing
volumes of environmentally destructive chemicals, in the interests of
agrobusiness firms, at great cost to the health of the land, the
agricultural workers and many farmers.
Rural blacks engaged in a long and bitter struggle to maintain their
control of land, and some form of access to land where whites had
excluded then from it, and to recover, retain, and build up their herds
of cattle. Before 1913 some purchased land; others squatted on land owned
by land companies or white farmers and engaged in share-, rent-, or
labour-tenancies to get access to some arable and grazing land. In the
1920s, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union [ICO* I articulated
tenant resistance to their loss of access to land on white farms.
The expansion of towns and mining settlements created opportunities
for Africans with access to land and to markets to increase the
production of crops and livestock for sale, particularly in areas where
black farmers acquired title to their land, but also in the native
reserves, and black tenants extended peasant commodity production on to
the land designated for white farming. Black farmers competed with whites
for the use of land, for labour, and in the markets for commodities.9
White farmers in turn competed for labour with mine owners and with
commercial and industrial firms.
A series of laws, notably the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Natives
Trust and Land Act of 1936, excluded Africans from buying or renting land
in white areas, though small pieces of land might be provided legally to
a designated number of households of labour tenants on white farms. They
were to be confined to land in the areas designated as, or added to, the
native reserves, which could provide a reservoir of migrant labour,
primarily for the mines, and also for farms and towns. These lands would
be protected from purchase by white farmers, but not against the state's
own capacity to dispose over them. The state authorized the occupation of
land in the reserves and its allocation b/ chiefs and administrators.
Implementation of these laws has been a slow process, extending over
many decades. Districts which sought to replace tenants with wage
workers after the passing of the 1936 Act found that their labour had
migrated to more favourable places. Only thirty years later did it prove
possible to replace labour tenancy with wage contracts. Since 1964 the
state has carried through a concerted and continuing assault against
African freehold land rights, renting of land, and labour tenancy, part
of the massive relocations of blacks to Bantustans and 'group areas'.
Farmers in the native reserves were increasingly constrained by lack
of sufficient land for cultivation and grazing, poor access to transport
and markets and loss of males to migrant labour. Government sought to
protect the soil and to raise agricultural productivity by betterment
planning, by which land would be allocated to woodland, arable, grazing
and residential areas and people relocated into concentrated villages, a
practice which goes back to the conquest of the Xhosa on the Eastern Cape
Frontier. The 1955 Toralinson Commission'3 proposed to settle full-time
African farmers on 'economic farm units' or, since land in the reserves
was so scarce, 'half-sized farm units', in planned areas; the rest of the
population would have to find wage employment. The government continued
to impose betterment but rejected Tomlinson's unrealistic plan to make
most of the people in the reserves landless.
Betterment disrupted people's lives and reduced the land available to
them for farming. It has been a source and focus of local resistance to
the chiefs through whom it has been imposed. It was exported northwards
to other African countries where it also did little for agricultural
production and rural incomes and provoked widespread resistance. In
recent years, the language and institutional forms of rural development,
as practised under the direction of international agencies, have been
imported into South Africa's homelands. Bantustan administrations have
adopted a policy of replacing communal with individual land tenure, and
enriched favoured, beneficiaries at the expense of the public purse.
Over the last three decades stagnating or even declining production
has been accompanied by rapidly increasing population and the massive
movement of people into the impoverished Bantustans. Many people are
concentrated in rural slums, termed 'closer settlements', with little or
no land to cultivate. Commodity production has declined, or become a
privilege open to a few, notably beneficiaries of the Bantustan
administrations.
The development of South African agriculture appears as a atory of fct
development of capitalist farming and the elimination or marginalizatiO[,*
of peasant farming. Rural Africans are steadily transformed into
proletarians, working for wages on farms, mines, and in towns, when th6y
are not left destitute. Peasant production appears to have a past, but
neither much of a present nor any sort of future. However, tha
transformation of agriculture in South Africa has been more complex,
varied and incomplete than the prevalent images of 'white capitalist'
 a( ,
'black subsistence1 fanning suggest. Whether the dispossession of
Africans peasants is irreversible and the future for South African
agriculture must rest with large-scale farming of a capitalist, or
possibly a cooperative or collective, variety is open to question -
continuing political issue.
Kenya
In Kenya white settler farms and plantations were established in the
colonial period limiting, but not preventing, the rise of peasant
production which was to expand dramatically after independence. Large
areas of land in and around the Rift Valley/ White Highlands were
appropriated for white settlement and sold cheaply to white farmers,
often over the heads of those who used the land for grazing or
cultivation.
Settlers acquired land, but lacked labour, as well as cattle and
relevant farming skills. Consequently, white farmers encouraged Africans
mainly Kikuyu, to settle on their farms with their cattle, providing
labour in exchange for access to land and grazing. They combined the
employment of tenants with migrant contract workers. Once they had
established their farms, white farmers sought to persuade the colonial
state to secure more effective control over both their land and their-
labour forces. Thus began a series of bitter conflicts which would
continue until independence.
White farmers secured a series of legislative and administrative
measures to bring resident labourers under their authority, constrain
their ability to change jobs, limit their stock, and increase their
labour obligations. Railway lines were built and tariffs set to favour-
white farmers. They wanted government* to assure them of stable and
remunerative maize prices. However, the interests of capitalist farmer q
differed among themselves. Plantations had higher demands for labour U l s m
did settler farmers who combined grain production with cattle keeping.
Plantations purchased maize for their workers rather than sold it. Many
African tenants left the farms rather than accept wage contracts and t*,e
loss of their stock. White farmers were thus never entirely successful ^n
reorganizing their estates in accordance with their conception of
capitalist farming.
Kenyan settlers were in a weak position to secure state support far
their claims during trade slumps, but were able to do so when the stat%
wanted to increase their production during and after the two world war3i
Thus Kenyan maize fanners only secured a control scheme to protect t£iair
maize prices during the second world war. Even then, Africans far from
Nairobi in Kavirondo were able to benefit from the transport subsidies
and those in Kiambu, close to Nairobi, to evade controls and sell ma-1*
directly.16
The land reserved for Africans was designated Crown land, and
were prevented from acquiring individual, and mortgageable, title.
colonial state prohibited Africans from growing coffee and tea and
keeping grade cattle, except within strict limits and in areas distant
from the white farms and areas of labour recruitment. Government policies
thus confined the opportunities open to African entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, Africans continued to use a large share of the land in the
White Highlands for their own farming. Producers in the native reserves
expanded their production of agricultural commodities, notably of maize
and of wattle.17
As in South Africa, government sought to deal with the consequences of
land scarcity in the reserves by imposing measures to protect the soil
against erosion and constraining commercial production of maize. The
authority of chiefs, and the communal allocation of land by chiefs, was
deemed necessary to save both the soil and the community. The restriction
of African commodity production, the expulsion of labour tenants, and the
imposition of agricultural regulations all contributed to the explosive
growth of African nationalism and the Mau Mau rebellion. ® Government met
the rebellion with massive coercion. The people in the Kikuyu and Erabu
reserves were herded into concentrated villages; large numbers of Kikuyu
were expelled from the White Highlands and from Nairobi to the reserves
and resettlement schemes.
The government now tried to promote soil conservation by encouraging
landowning agricultural entrepreneurs. It sought to use the opportunity
provided by the Emergency to consolidate and to register title to land
and organise settlement around villages. However, the rights of small
as well as large landholders, though not of tenants, were protected. The
government selectively allowed Africans to grow coffee, tea, and
pyrethrum and to keep dairy cattle. The incomes projected for African
farmers, and the land available to them, were appropriate to peasant
producers rather than capitalist entrepreneurs. After the Emergency,
people abandoned the villages into which they had been resettled.
The promised agricultural revolution had to await the redistribution
of white-owned land before and after independence, and the expansion of
production of high-value cash crops amongst larger numbers of
smallholders. State agencies and transnational companies directed the
expansion of coffee, tea, pyrethrura, dairy and sugar production through
their control of marketing and thereby consolidated the growth of a
middle peasantry and restricted the expansion of private trade in
agricultural produce. Increased export production by smallholders
provided the foreign exchange to finance the growth of industry and
commerce.
The benefits of increased smallholder production have accrued
disproportionately to households, and to regions, with access to fertile
land on which it is possible to grow lucrative crops. Smallholding
families have combined agricultural production with urban employment,
both as a means for meeting consumption needs and, among the better
provided, as a source of funds for agricultural investments. In less
favoured regions, rural residents, mainly women have become increasingly
impoverished depending on poor local earnings and meagre remittances from
migrant relatives to meet their needs. Pastoralists have been confined
to colonial 'reserves' and, more recently, group ranches and grazing
schemes designed to open grazing land for commercial ranching.
The transfer of large 'mixed' farms to African ownership provided
opportunities for rural entrepreneurship, economic and political, to the
expanding African bourgeoisie. Between independence in 1963 and 1968, the
smallholder share of agricultural commercial production increased
dramatically to match the contribution of plantations and large farms.
The increase in smallholder production was most marked in the production
of crops for export, which enabled smallholders to benefit from commodity
booms in the 1970s, and left them vulnerable to the recessions of the
1980s. Large-scale farmers have concentrated on maize and cattle.
produced mainly for more stable and protected domestic markets.
Multinational companies continue to maintain plantations which produce
exports alongside smallholders and to dominate ranching.
White settlers in Kenya were never able to exclude African producers
from the land or from access to markets to the extent that was possible
in South Africa. The independence settlement changed the balance between
capitalist and peasant fanning. It compensated whites for the value of
the lands they had appropriated and protected and partly Africanized the
capitalist farm sector. Kenyan capitalists have used their political
power and their wealth to acquire land and protect large-scale farming
but not to displace the smallholders on whose export earnings the economy
depends. Scarcities of land and falling export revenues may intensify
conflicts over the allocation of resources, but they may be more likely
to take place along ethnic and regional than along class lines.
Nigeria
Prior to colonial conquest, southern Nigeria was a major exporter of wild
palm produce. The building of railways and, belatedly, roads by the
colonial government created conditions for the expansion of commercial
production of arable and tree crops for local and export markets, and of
the trade in livestock. By the end of the colonial period, Nigeria was
the world's largest exporter of palm produce and groundnuts and, after
Ghana, of cocoa. Nigeria also exported quantities of cotton, rubber, shea
nut and sesame seed. An oligopoly of foreign merchant companies dominated
imports and exports, but the extensive network of trade for domestic
markets was developed by African traders.
In Nigeria peasants' exports secured the government's revenue base.
Trading companies did not wish to be excluded from markets by planters
and oilseed manufacturers. Colonial governments therefore resisted
Lever's demands that they provide land, labour and trading monopolies for
plantations in southern Nigeria. The government itself assumed ownership
of land in the North, and vested control of land in the chiefs to protect
peasant land from alienation. In practice, Nigerians bought and sold
land, though in most rural areas the availability of farm land kept
prices relatively low. In southern Nigeria, 'strangers' gained access to
land and crops through rent- and share-tenancy agreements.
Office-holders and merchants used various institutions to try to
secure labour from their subjects, clients or debtors, and irrigated land
and contracts from the state. But they lacked the control of land
necessary to subordinate producers to wage labour on their own terms.
Throughout Nigeria, peasant households emerged as the predominant form of
rural producers. People migrated extensively among rural areas to find
land for arable and tree crops or for grazing, as well as to escape their
erstwhile slave status or oppressive exactions by officials. In many
communities, the management of different crops was divided between men
and women. Among both Yoruba and Hausa farmers, men managed crop
production. Economic opportunities outside the household enabled sons to
contest these demands and to modify their terms and gave rise to
conflicts, often covert, over men's capacity to command their wives
labour-time. Seasonal migrant workers were recruited from diverse areas
to harvest crops. Nevertheless, family labour predominated and most wage
labour was recruited from local farming families. In the absence of a
landless class in the rural areas, agricultural wages remained relatively
high.
During the second world war, the state took over the export and
pricing of crops for exports. After the war, the state marketing boards
justified their licensing of produce traders by the need to regulate
competition and thereby protect the producers from exploitation by
3'middlemen1. From the Second World War until 1986, the state marketing
boards used their monopoly over exports to impose very heavy taxation on
rural producers. However, agricultural exports only began to decline
sharply after the Nigerian civil war and the rise of mineral oil exports.
Imports of wheat, rice, maize, meat, milk, day old chicks, and even
vegetable oils then rose precipitately, accentuated by the overvaluation
of the naira. Nevertheless, increased demand encouraged grain producers
in northern Nigeria to expand production for urban and for rural markets
in Nigeria and Niger after the end of the 1972-74 Sahel drought. A Grains
Marketing Board was set up in 1977. In most years it bought no grain but
it did buy yellow maize selectively from capitalist farmers and traders
when capitalists could not find a market for their grain at an adequate
price. 6 In 1986 the marketing boards were abolished, the naira was
devalued and the import of a wide range of agricultural commodities
banned. This raised the prices of export and locally consumed crops and
encouraged some revival of crops such as cocoa and cotton.
Before World War II, official policy was generally cautious about
interfering with existing farming practices. The government tried to
regulate cotton production and cotton markets, and promoted cooperative
marketing of cocoa. Attempts to promote 'mixed1 grain and cattle farming,
irrigation, resettlement and mechanization had little success or impact-
Since the war, Nigerian governments have initiated various projects,
some funded by international agencies, to modernize peasant agriculture
and to promote large-scale farming, capitalist and state-run. They have
financed settlement schemes, established plantations for cultivated oil
palms, rubber and sugar and set up state farms and ranches. Under the
auspices of World Bank agricultural development projects, state
governments have subsidized and distributed credit, fertilizers and
tractors, promoted high-yielding cocoa trees and yellow maize. Without
World Bank assistance, governments paid for grandiose dams and gravity
irrigation systems; they appropriated vast amounts of monay and water and
produced limited quantities of wheat, rice, sugar, and tomatoes at great
economic and environmental cost. Since the ban on wheat imports, large
areas of scrub bush have been cleared and levelled to produce winter
wheat with tubewell irrigation. This has excluded pastoralists from
access to dry-season grazing, and is likely to erode soil and reduce
fertility in the search for quick profits. The Land Use Decree extended
governments legal rights to control the disposition of land, but
governments face political limits to their capacity to appropriate land
for irrigation schemes, ranches and large-scale farming schemes.
Governments' and World Bank efforts to promote agricultural production
have been marked by an ignorance of the conditions under which peasants
cultivate and of demand for their crops, and by high costs and poor,
generally negative, net returns. The major contribution of governments
in Nigeria to increasing agricultural production has been to build and
maintain roads. The Nigerian state subsidized the entry of urban-based
capitalist farmers into potentially lucrative but import-dependent
niches, such as yellow maize, poultry, and ranching; import bans have
created new niches for capitalist farmers using subsidized tubewells.
These subsidizies make profits for well-connected capitalists, but do
little to contribute to meeting Nigeria's staple food needs.
In Nigeria since the colonial period, agricultural production for both
overseas and internal markets has depended almost entirely on peasant
smallholders. There have been significant differences and important
changes in the relative incomes of peasants growing different crops and
living in different parts of the country, and in the extent of
inequalities within rural communities. In some important areas of
commercial agriculture where ample land suitable for growing lucrative
crops was initially available to those able to develop it, a group of
wealthy fanners emerged, who typically combined farming with lucrative
commercial activities; subsequent inward migration reduced the supply of
land. The result was the emergence of a relatively unequal rural
community/ but also to constrain the further expansion of inequalities in
access to land and to incomes within those areas.
Between 1939 and 1986 the Nigerian state used its control of the
exports trade to tax peasants heavily, ultimately undermining Nigeria's
agricultural exports. Oil exports briefly allowed the state the illusion
that it could import cheap food and overlook the importance of
agricultural exports.Fortunately, the government never took control of
the internal market for food and other crops so that peasants,
particularly in the north, could take advantage of rising prices and
expand production of crops for the Nigerian market, despite competition
from cheap imports.
Holders of political, civil and military office have sought from
government, and often obtained, access to rain-fed and irrigated land,
cheap credit, fertilizers, tractors, and guaranteed prices for their
crops. This has enabled some of them to make money from their investments
in farming. However, they have been unable to secure sufficient control
over the labour power of others to establish secure foundations for
capitalist farming in Nigeria. Their contribution to agricultural
production has been marginal. Nigeria must continue to look to the
peasantry to supply its food and to produce crops for export.
Tanzania
Agriculture in Tanganyika, under German and British colonial rule,
combined production by plantations, settler farmers and African peasant
producers. Settlers were largely restricted to the Arusha and Kilimanjaro
areas. They grew coffee for export and tobacco for the protected local
market. They were unable to prevent Africans from growing coffee as their
Kenyan compatriots had done. From the German period, smallholders grew
coffee in Bukoba and Kilimanjaro and cotton in Sukumaland. But most
smallholder production was devoted to food crops. Colonial Tanganyika's
main export was sisal production on plantations employing migrant workers
from areas in the south of the country with poor access to markets.
Tanganyika's limited export earnings meant that the administration was
always concerned with raising revenue and saving money. Levels of food
production were vulnerable to drought and in poor years had to be
supplemented by imports and famine relief. Taxes were high relative to
cash earnings. Officials sought to regulate peasant production and
marketing by administrative direction. They tried to organise coffee, and
later tobacco, marketing and cotton marketing and ginning by creating
cooperatives. Regulations variously sought to enforce crop acreages for
export crops on the one hand and food or 'famine' crops on the other, to
counter soil erosion and plant and animal diseases, and to impose
improved methods of cultivation. Resistance to agricultural regulations,
and to chiefs who implemented them, and resentment at the limited access
of Africans to trading opportunities provided support for nationalism in
rural areas of Tanganyika.
Attempts to enforce agricultural regulations were abandoned in face of
popular opposition. Government tried instead to 'transform' farmers by
resettling them, and to 'improve' agriculture by encouraging 'master
farmers' to innovate. Peasant production of export crops, especially
cotton, coffee and cashew nuts, expanded in the 1950s and 1960s. After
independence, several sisal plantations were taken over by their workers
as cooperatives. Falling international demand, poor prices and low
productivity drastically reduced sisal exports.
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Independent Tanganyika took over from its colonial predecessor a
heritage of administrative regulation and state control of marketing and
a Fabian ideology of promoting cooperation to protect African
communities from the disruptive consequences of western capitalism and
of state direction of 'development'. The relative weakness of both
capitalist and peasant agriculture in Tanzania gave the state greater
scope to extend its controls over agricultural marketing, retail
distribution and even rural settlement than other governments. It could
not make peasants produce crops for sale to legal markets for meagre
returns. Between 1967 and 1984 Tanzanian socialism exemplified most
sharply the ideology and practice of state direction of 'rural
development1 promoted by colonial officials, nationalist politicians,
Fabian intellectuals and international development agencies throughout
Africa, and beyond."
Convergences and divergences
Barrington Moore, in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,
identified as critical to the subsequent trajectories of the societies he
studied three forms of transition to commercial agriculture: they
required respectively bourgeois democratic revolutions, conservative
revolutions from above culminating ultimately in fascist regimes, and
peasants revolutions giving rise to communist states. Ultimately, they
all converged on a common destination - modern, industrial society. In
all Moore's cases the state carried out a 'revolution from above',
before or after, or even in the absence of, political revolution. In
Moore's view, a modern society is one without peasants. Whatever their
part in the destruction of the old regimes, peasants were bound to be the
victims of the revolutions. The continued domination of the Indian
countryside by peasants was both evidence of and reason for the failure
of the Indian state to create a modern society.
In each of our African examples, the colonial powers defined state
boundaries and created state institutions, through which they changed
local societies and their relations to the wider world. The post-colonial
state has been central to the formation of locally dominant classes, the
extension of national control over resources and the pursuit of
'development'. However, except in South Africa, peasants have not been
displaced, a sign for the 'development community' of the backwardness of
rural Africa and the need to 'modernize' it. Contrary to this image,
Africa is part of the modern world and is integrated into a monetary
economy.
At first sight, our four African examples appear to exemplify distinct
patterns of historical transformation. South Africa might be taken as an
example of the imposition of a form of agricultural capitalism and
dispossession of the peasantry, comparable to Lenin's 'Junker path' to
agrarian capitalism. Peasants continue to dominate agricultural
production in Nigeria and in Tanzania. Whereas Nigeria has been
dominated, both before and since independence, by variants of commercial
capitalism, the Tanzanian state drew on its colonial heritage to produce
a strategy of developing the countryside through a form of rural
socialism. Kenya (like Zimbabwe) has proved more ambiguous. From the
perspective of the late colonial period, Kenya seemed to have more in
common with South Africa than with the countries where peasant
agriculture survives. The expansion of peasant production since
independence has brought about an uneasy balance between capitalist and
peasant farming. It has also encouraged a revision of the view that
colonial rule marginalised the peasantry. The timing of our perspective
is crucial to the ways we understand history.
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Still, we may from our African examples be able to identify three
variants of rural transition, one capitalist and two peasant (one in a
'capitalist' and one in a 'socialist' context), and an anomalous fourth
version, combining capitalist and peasant forms. However, a number of
motifs reappear in the descriptions of several countries, crossing the
boundaries delineated by our typologies. Wage labour and family labour
are found in agricultural production in all the countries studied, and
labour-, share- and rent tenancies are important in several. These
different forms of labour are combined in single enterprises, both on
capitalist and peasant farms, and in the strategies adopted by
individuals and households to provide for their needs.
These observations suggest that empirical events tend to escape the
limits of the broad concepts we use to analyse them, such as capitalism,
peasants or households. They also raise questions about the way we
interpret similar phenomena which appear in different contexts. Is wage
labour on peasant farms evidence of the penetration of capitalist
principles into the peasantry? Is renting or sharecropping the land of a
widow who is unable to plough her own land the same as cultivating part
of a large company estate? Are labour tenants to be interpreted as
peasant producers, providing labour in order to gain access to land, or
as wage workers remunerated partly in kind and tied to their employers'
land?
Tenancy and labour contracts which are not based solely on cash
payments may be interpreted as aspects of a process of transition
towards, or possibly away, from capitalism. But they can only be
identified as such after the event, or by first assuming a prior theory
of historical change. They will be interpreted differently according to
our historical vantage-point. They also look quite different to the
various participants, depending on where they stand in these
relationships. Conflicts between landowners and labour tenants have
proved to be extremely bitter because they go beyond the negotiation of
terms - how many days labour is to be provided, how much arable or
grazing land is to be available, how much cash is to be paid - to the
nature of the relationship itself. People challenge one another's claims
to the rights to use and to dispose over 'their' land and 'their time'
and seek to enforce these claims through the courts or, more often, by
the direct deployment, or the threat, of private and public violence.
Governments of different political persuasions have followed many of
the same policies as each other, before and after independence. Colonial
administrations tended to adopt similar views and policies towards the
administration and the use of 'native' land in all countries. Fashions in
colonial agricultural policies changed, but tended to do so across rather
than within colonial boundaries. Similarly, the international development
agencies reproduce similar institutional forms and policy prescriptions
across the continent and, indeed, the globe. °
The state's control of land rights has been central to colonial and post-
colonial plans for social and political engineering. In some cases,
extensive areas were granted to settlers and to companies for
plantations; in others peasant rights to land were protected, or a
balance was struck between the two. Colonial rulers initially tended to
favour forms of individual property rights for indigenous peoples, to
reward their collaborators and to encourage commercial farming. Their
successors preferred to vest ownership of African land in the colonial
state and to allocate it under a system of 'communal land tenure1 through
their 'Native Authorities'. This was intended to bolster the power, and
perhaps the incomes, of colonial chiefs, to enable colonial officials to
direct the activities of African farmers and to protect the peasantry
from the consequences of commercial developments.
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The failures of, and resistance tof agricultural 'betterment' turned
state ideology in Kenya, and belatedly in South Africa, to favour
individual title to promote a stratum of rural entrepreneurs farming
'economically-viable' holdings. Independent Tanzania preferred the
earlier colonial ideology; nationalization of land provided a legal
framework for reordering rural land rights and forms of settlement. In
Nigeria, the state revived and extended the colonial claim to own all
land to make it easier to appropriate land for public, and for private
capitalist, purposes. The legal forms of individual 'freehold' property
have been used to deny people their claims to land rights.
'Nationalization' has served a variety of ideological and political
purposes; it has been used to dispossess peasants from their lands to to
subordinate them to state directives.
'Development' villages were central to the strategy of rural socialism
in in Tanzania. They were justified by the need to bring people together
under a common administration so that the state can more easily provide
them with services and encourage them to work together for their own
development. They were to enable the state to extend its reach into the
countryside and bring people under official surveillance. On the Eastern
Cape frontier, during the nineteenth century, nucleated settlements were
variously promoted to encourage Africans to adopt modern practices, to
concentrate displaced groups into small areas, and to control a
recalcitrant people. In Kenya during the Emergency, government relocated
people into villages, and sought to base their strategies of agricultural
improvement on the new village settlements. In Abakaliki, Eastern Nigeria
the colonial government set up a rural water supply project as a way of
creating nucleated villages to deal with a breakdown of order. They
failed to supply rural water, but did relocate people into villages.
Tanzania's combination of relocating people into village settlements,
planned on straight lines in military fashion with compulsory
agricultural improvement has its most influential African antecedent in
the policy of 'betterment planning' in South Africa's 'native reserves'.
All sorts of governments have shown a penchant for regulating
agricultural marketing and establishing marketing boards for exports as
well as for domestically traded crops. The rule has been that state
marketing arrangements and other interventions- subsidise capitalist
farmers and tax peasants; where peasants have benefitted it has usually
been as a consequence of the extension of subsidies to large-scale
farmers. Governments and firms have tried to use their control of
irrigated land and the marketing of processed crops to make farmers grow
specific crops according to their instructions.
Are these similarities simply the consequences of fashions in the
policies of colonial administrators and development agencies? Do they
reflect common assumptions about peasant backwardness and common problems
in taxing and controlling peasants. Are they only superficial phenomenal
appearances, belying essential differences? Or do they suggest that there
are fundamental similarities in the social structures and state policies
of countries who seem to have developed along such different lines?
It seems that our examples do not display clearly divergent
directions, but rather a variety of overlaps, cross-overs and
combinations. But they are also not obviously converging on some common
destination. In particular, they are not all undergoing the passage from
peasant to capitalist, or even to socialist, agriculture. In some cases,
the direction of change may be quite the reverse.
14
References
* K. Marx Capital, vo l . 1 [1867], Harmondswth: Penguin 1975, Ch. 33.
A. Whitahead 'Women m Rural Food Production 1n Sub-Saharan A f r i ca ' , Symposium on Food Strategies,
World Ins t i t u te for Development Economies Research, Helsinki 1986; P. Roberts 'Rural women's
access to labour in West Afr ica1 1n J . Parpart and S. Stichter (eds) Patriarchy and Class in
Africa. Beverly H i l l a i Sage, 1988.
A. Adams 'The Senegal River Valley' and J. Heyer et a l . 'Rural development' In J. Heyer, P.
Roberts and G. Williams (eds) Rural Development 1n Tropical Africa, London: Macmi l lan 1981.
S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds) Economy and Society In Pro-Industrial South Africa, London: Longmans
1980; W. Beinart, P, Deiius and S. Trapido (eds.) Putting a Plough to the Ground London:
Longmans, 1984j T. Keegan Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa, London:
Macmman 1987; R. F i rs t Bethal Case Book, Africa South 2, 3, 1958; T. Marcus Modernising
Super-Exploitation, London: Zed 1989.
C, Desmond The Discarded People, Harmortdsworth: Penguin 1970; Surplus People's Project, Forced
Removals in South Africa, 5 vols. Cape Town 1983; L. Piatzky and C. Walker The Surplus
People, Johannesburg: Ravan 1985. ' Bantustans' refers to the areas o r i g ina l l y designated as
'native reserves'. Subsequently these areas were o f f i c i a l l y designated as 'Bantu homelands',
'national states' and even 'independent states' - though some have no* repudiated thei r
MDependence'. These terms convey the flavour of o f f i c i a l apartheid ideology; 'native
reserves' and 'Bantustans' better represent the purposes for which they were established and
the i r subordinated and Impoverished rea l i t i es .
T. Marcus Modernising Super-Exploitation: Restructuring South African Agriculture, London: Zed
1989.
F. Wilson 'Farming', In M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds) The Oxford History of South Africa, vo l .
2, Oxford University Press 1971.
J* H. Bradford A Taste of freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press 1987.
C. Bundy The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. London: Heinemann 1979.
M. Lacey Uorking for Boroko, Johannesburg: Ravan 1981.
M. Morris 'The development of cap i ta l is t agriculture in South Afr ica ' Economy and Society, 5, 3,
1976; S. Greenberg Race and State 1n Capitalist Development, New Haven: Yale University Press
1980, part 1 .
J. Peires The Dead Will Arise, London: James Currey 1989.
Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas
within the Union of South Africa, UG/61, Pretoria 1955.
C. de Wet 'Betterment planning 1n a rural v i l lage 1n Keiskairmahoek, Ciskei1 and P. McAllister
'Resistance to "betterment" In the Transkei', in Journal of Southern African Studies 15, 2,
1989.
W. Beinart 'Soi l erosion, conservationism and ideas about development' Journal of Southern
African Studies 11, 1, 1985, and The Politics of Conservation in Southern Africa, Special
Issue of Journal of Southern African Studies 15, 2, 1989.
G. Hitching Class and Economic Change in Kenya, New Haven : Yale University Press 1980, pp. 109-
10.
M. Cowan 'Commodity production 1n Kenya's Central Province1 in Heyer et a l . Rural Development.
J. Lonsdale 'Explanations of the Mau Mau revolt ' 1n T. Lodge (ed.) Resistance and Ideology in
Sett ler Societies, Johannesburg: Ravan Press 1986, D. Throup Economic and Social Origins of
Mau Mau 1945-53, London: James Currey 1986; T. Kanogo Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau,
London: James Currey 1987; F. Furedi The Mau Mau War 1n Perspective, London: James Currey
1989.
19
M.J.K. Sorrenson Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country. Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1967.
M. Cowen 'Commodity production'; C. Leo Land and Class in Kenya, Toronto University Press 1984.
This 1s discussed in Elizabeth Francis's forthcoming Oxford D. Phil.study of a d i s t r i c t in
Western Kenya.
22
H. Kelly 'Development p r i o r i t i e s 1n ar id areas' Rural Africana 1986, 25-26.
J. Heyer, J . Maltha and W. Senga (eds) Agricultural Development m Kenya, Nairobi: Oxford
University Press 1975; J . Heyer 'Agricultural development policy 1n Kenya from the colonial
period to 1975' 1n Heyer et a l . Rural Development,
15
24
R. W. Shenton 77M Development of Capitalism in Northern Nigeria, London: James Currey 1986; P.
H i l l Rural Hausa% Cambridge University Press 1972; S. 8erry Cocoa, Custom and Socio-economic
Change in Rural Hestem Nigeria, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975.
P. Roberts 'Rural women 1n Wesem Nigeria and Hauss Niger1 in K. Young et a i . Serving Tuo Masters
26
T. Forrest 'Agricultural pol ic ies in Nigeria, 1900-1978' 1n Heyer et a1. Rural Development; G.
Williams 'Marketing without and with marketing boards' Review of African Political Economy
34, 1985; P. Clough 'The Production and Marketing of Cash Crops and Grains 1n Northern
Nigeria, 1965* Unpublished Consultancy Report for the World Sank 1986.
M. Watts (ed.) State, Oil and Agriculture in Nigeria, Berkeley: Ins t i tu te of Internat ional
Studies 1987; G. Andrae and B. Sectarian The Hheat Trap, London.* Zed 1985.
K. Kimmaoe 'The evolution of the wheat trap: the great Nigerian wheat rush1, Department of
Geography, University of Cambridge, 1989.
G. Williams 'The World Bank 1n rural Nigeria rev is i ted ' Review of African Political Economy 43,
1968.
G. Williams 'Why 1s there no agrarian capitalism 1n Nigeria?' Journal of Historical Sociology 1,
4, 1988, which draws heavily on Paul Clough's forthcoming 0. Ph i l , thesis fo r Oxford
University.
A. Couison Tanzania, Oxford University Press 1982, and 'Agricultural pol icies 1n mainland
Tanzania 1946-76' 1n Heyer et a l . Rural Development; J . I U f f e A History of Modern Tanganyika
Cambridge University Press 1980..
J . Nyerere 'The Arusha Declaration' [1967] and 'Socialism and rural development'. [1967], 1n
freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press 1968.
J
 G. Williams 'Taking the part of peasants', 1rt P. Gutkind and I . Wallerstein (eds) The Political
Economy of Contemporary Africa, Beverly H i l l s : Sage, 2nd ed, 1985 and Coulson Tanzania; R.G.
Abrahams Villagers, Villages and the State in Modern Tanzania, Cambridge: Afr ican Studies
Centre. 2nd ed. 1987.
C.S.L. Chachage 'Br i t i sh rule and African c i v i l i z a t i o n in Tanganyika1 Journal of Historical
Sociology 1, 2, 1988.
M. Cowen and R. Shenton 'The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in A f r i ca ' , Journal of
Historical Sociology.
B. Moore, j r . The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon 1966. His case
studies were of England, France, the USA, Japan, China and India, with a comparative
discussion of Germany and Russia.
V . I . Lenin The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 19QS-1907
[1908]. In Collected Works, vo l . 13; cf . The Development of Capitalism in Russia [1899],
Collected Horks, vo l . 3.
G. Williams 'The World Bank and the peasant problem' in Heyer et a l . Rural Development.
0. OkwudiH 'The po l i t i ca l economy of rural development' D. Ph i l , thesis, Unversity of Sussex
1983.
